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BROWN AND THE DESEGREGATION OF VIRGINIA 
LAW SCHOOLS 
Carl W. Tobias * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One-half century ago, the Supreme Court of the United States 
declared unconstitutional racially segregated public elementary 
and secondary schools in Brown v. Board of Education. 1 The 
pathbreaking opinion culminated a three-decade effort that the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
("NAACP") and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund 
("LDF"), an independent litigating entity, had orchestrated. An 
important feature of the evolving NAACP and LDF tactical ap-
proach was to contest the segregation of government-sponsored 
professional and graduate education, particularly implicating law 
schools in jurisdictions bordering the South, namely Maryland, 
Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas.2 Charles Hamilton Houston and 
Thurgood Marshall as well as their colleagues at the LDF, includ-
ing Robert Carter and Constance Baker Motley, considered pro-
fessional and graduate education as a general matter, and legal 
training specifically, comparatively vulnerable to attack in those 
states.3 Moreover, these pioneering attorneys and the NAACP 
* Williams Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., 1968, 
Duke University; LL.B., 1972, University of Virginia. 
I wish to thank Sashi Athota, John Barden, Margaret Sanner, Jonathan Stubbs, and 
Gail Zwirner for valuable suggestions, Nancy Nock for processing this piece as well as 
Russell Williams for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine alone. 
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERCIA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975); 
CHARLES T. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF 
CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 3-14 (2004). 
2. See ROBERT T. PATTERSON, BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS 
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 14-17 (2001); MARK V. TuSHNET, THE NAACP'S 
LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 42-45 (1987). 
3. See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 15; TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 42. 
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seemed to emphasize the desegregation of law schools for reasons 
intrinsic to legal education, such as preparing additional African-
American practicing lawyers who would vindicate fundamental 
civil rights through litigation.4 
The Supreme Court decided the Missouri, 5 Oklahoma, 6 and 
Texas 7 challenges by ordering the government-supported law 
schools in those jurisdictions to admit the African-American 
plaintiffs, while the Justices' resolution of the Texas appeal most 
directly fostered the determination which the Court issued in 
Brown.8 However, attempts to combat segregated government-
sponsored legal education, mainly through litigation, proceeded 
in the overwhelming majority of the border and southern states.9 
These propositions and the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme 
Court ruling in Brown mean that the desegregation of Virginia 
law schools warrants assessment. This article undertakes that ef-
fort. The first section in the piece descriptively reviews the ori-
gins and development of the principal national challenges to seg-
regated legal education. The second part initially evaluates how 
no African American matriculated at any accredited law school 
which operated in the Commonwealth until the mid-twentieth 
century. The segment then explores why and how African Ameri-
cans desegregated the University of Virginia and the College of 
William and Mary, the two government-supported institutions 
that offered legal training, before the Supreme Court had ren-
dered the landmark Brown decision. 
The University of Virginia School of Law admitted Gregory H. 
Swanson in September 1950 after his attorneys, including Oliver 
W. Hill, Sr., Spottswood W. Robinson, III, and Thurgood Mar-
shall, persuaded a three-judge federal court to mandate his en-
rollment.10 This successful litigation, especially the panel finding 
that denial of Swanson's application violated the United States 
Constitution, apparently convinced the Marshall-Wythe School of 
4. See TuSHNET, supra note 2, at 42. 
5. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
6. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948). 
7. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
8. See Jonathan L. Entin, Sweatt v. Painter, the End of Segregation, and the Trans-
formation of Education Law, 5 REV. LITIG. 3, 69 (1986). 
9. See OGLETREE, supra note 1, at 120. 
10. See Swanson v. Rector of Visitors of the Univ. of Va., No. 30 (W.D. Va. Sept. 5, 
1950) (order granting preliminary injunction); see also Brief for Plaintiff, Swanson, No. 30. 
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Law at the College of William and Mary to accept Edward Travis 
the following year. 11 
The section next canvasses the slow pace at which legal educa-
tion's integration proceeded in the Old Dominion after the Uni-
versity of Virginia and the Marshall-Wythe Schools of Law had 
admitted their first African-American students and even once the 
Justices had published the Brown opinion. The survey ascertains 
that the public institutions, as well as the University of Rich-
mond and Washington and Lee University, the Commonwealth's 
two mid-century private schools, acted with considerably more de-
liberation than speed. The essay concludes by proffering several 
lessons which can be extracted from the desegregation of legal 
education in the Old Dominion. 
II. THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN 
During the early 1930s, the NAACP and the LDF decided that 
the organizations would commit significant litigation resources to 
challenging segregated government-sponsored professional and 
graduate education in numerous jurisdictions which bordered the 
South as well as to contesting the unequal nature of separate 
primary and secondary schools located in the states of the old 
Confederacy, rather than frontally attacking the constitutionality 
of segregated primary and secondary education in the South. 12 
Both the law school litigation and the cases that aimed at in-
creasing and ostensibly equalizing public resources budgeted for 
schools which African-American children attended were generally 
easier to win, albeit difficult to enforce.13 Those forms oflawsuits 
seemed to threaten white, majority interests less and the defen-
dants were apparently not as committed to preserving the status 
quo, while most judges, who had secured their legal training in 
law schools, could appreciate how separate institutions for Afri-
can Americans would rarely be equal. 14 
The first litigation which the LDF, Charles Hamilton Houston, 
and Thurgood Marshall pursued challenging racially segregated 
11. See PETER WALLENSTEIN, BLUE LAWS AND BLACK CODES: CONFLICT, COURTS, AND 
CHANGE IN TwENTIETH-CENTURY VIRGINIA 107-08 (2004). 
12. See OGLETREE, supra note 1, at 113, 117-23; TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 42-45. 
13. See OGLETREE, supra note 1, at 113. 
14. See id. at 118-19. 
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legal education involved Donald Murray, an African-American 
resident of Baltimore who wanted to enroll at the University of 
Maryland School of Law. 15 The Maryland Court of Appeals found 
insufficient the defendant's provision of a "scholarship" to acquire 
legal training outside Maryland or the eventual creation of a 
separate law school for African Americans, because the former 
would not constitute equal treatment and the latter would not be 
immediate, while the judges ordered the institution to admit the 
plaintiff. 16 However, this 1936 ruling's application was narrowly 
confined to a single jurisdiction, although the Maryland state 
court case disposition influenced the next major piece of litigation 
which attacked segregated legal education that the LDF filed. 17 
During the mid-1930s, the NAACP and the LDF began plan-
ning a challenge to the University of Missouri School of Law ini-
tiative that denied African-American residents entry but would 
pay their tuition to undertake legal education in jurisdictions 
apart from Missouri. 18 In 1938, the decision of the Supreme Court 
of the United States invalidating the Missouri endeavor depended 
substantially on the legal reasoning enunciated in the Maryland 
precedent, and required the law school to accept Lloyd Gaines. 19 
However, the Justices did not overturn the separate but equal 
doctrine, 20 which the Court had articulated in the 1896 case of 
Plessy u. Ferguson. 21 
Throughout the Second World War, the NAACP and the LDF 
suspended their efforts to desegregate public law schools out of 
concern that the groups' suits which vindicated civil rights might 
15. Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936); see CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, 
DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 50-57 (1993); J. CLAY 
SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LA WYER 1844-1944, at 148 (1993). 
16. Pearson, 182 A. at 593-94; see also SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF 
INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 209-10 
(2004); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: How A DEDICATED BAND OF 
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 63 (1994); TUSHNET, supra note 2, 
at 56--58. 
17. See PETER IRONS, JIM CROW'S CHILDREN: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE BROWN 
DECISION 55 (2002). 
18. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1938); see also KLUGER, 
supra note 1, at 202. This initiative resembled programs developed by a plethora of addi-
tional jurisdictions. See infra notes 30, 35, 40, 63, 64. 
19. Gaines, 305 U.S. at 345--52. 
20. Id. at 344-52. 
21. 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also GREENBERG, supra note 16, at 57-58, 70-71; 
OGLETREE, supra note 1, at 108--11. 
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seem unpatriotic, while the NAACP and the LDF concentrated 
their activities on the integration of the United States armed 
forces deploying political means. 22 After the wartime hiatus, the 
two entities resumed the litigation campaign against segregated 
government-supported legal education. 
In 1948, the NAACP and the LDF convinced the Supreme 
Court of the United States that the University of Oklahoma 
School of Law's failure to enroll Ada Louise Sipuel, an African-
American female applicant whom the institution had excluded 
solely on the basis of her race, violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause.23 In 1950, the Justices concomi-
tantly found unacceptable the insulting separate program which 
the same university's graduate education school had created for 
George McLaurin, an African-American college professor, by bar-
ring him from classrooms and cafeterias that white students 
populated, and ordered the institution to admit McLaurin fully in 
its education department.24 
The identical year, the NAACP and the LDF persuaded the 
Supreme Court of the United States to hold deficient a separate 
law school for African Americans which the Texas state govern-
ment had hastily assembled and to mandate that the University 
of Texas enroll Heman Sweatt.25 The Justices' opinion was replete 
with signals on which the LDF attorneys would capitalize when 
framing the arguments that the LDF tendered in Brown.26 For 
example, the Court's Sweatt v. Painter ruling intimated that 
separate educational facilities could not be equal due to numerous 
specific considerations, such as physical facilities, law journal and 
networking opportunities, as well as professors' abilities and 
reputations. 27 
22. See IRONS, supra note 17, at 55; see also CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY, EQUAL 
JUSTICE UNDER LAW 62 (1998). 
23. See Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); see also ROWAN, supra note 15, 
at 145-49, 153-55; TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 120-23. 
24. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); see also 
GREENBERG, supra note 16, at 66-78; OGLETREE, supra note 1, at 122; MARK V. TUSHNET, 
MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 130 (1994). 
25. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); see also Entin, supra note 8, at 3. Some 
states belatedly created separate schools. 
26. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 135. 
27. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633-35; see also GREENBERG, supra note 16, at 69-73; 
PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 16-17. 
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These signposts, which Thurgood Marshall and his LDF col-
leagues perceived when reading the law school cases, especially 
the determination that implicated Texas, in part encouraged the 
NAACP and the LDF to modify their litigation strategy.28 Rather 
than continue challenging segregated government-sponsored pro-
fessional and graduate education furnished by the border states 
and the provision of unequal primary and secondary schools, the 
organizations decided to attack frontally segregation in the old 
Confederacy's primary and secondary educational systems and 
the separate prong of the Plessy separate but equal formulation. 29 
In short, the national litigation campaign which sought to 
eliminate segregation that government-supported law schools 
practiced was an important constituent of the NAACP and LDF 
tactical approach during the 1930s and 1940s. The successes 
which the groups achieved when desegregating legal education in 
the border states did not foster particularly expeditious integra-
tion of the historically white law schools that every southern ju-
risdiction operated, however. For instance, all states' public law 
schools denied admission to African-American applicants, and 
numerous jurisdictions, including Virginia, offered African 
Americans out-of-state scholarships, while a few jurisdictions, 
such as North Carolina and South Carolina, established separate 
law schools for African Americans.30 The next portion of this es-
say, therefore, scrutinizes the desegregation of legal education in 
the Commonwealth. 
Ill. DESEGREGATION IN VIRGINIA 
A. Segregated Legal Education in Virginia 
Before 1950, no African American had matriculated at either 
28. See KLUGER, supra note 1, at 474; OGLETREE, supra note 1, at 122. These ideas 
are disputed. For instance, the LDF did not follow one litigation strategy, and some 
NAACP and LDF leaders favored direct attacks on Plessy's separate prong at different 
times. See also OLIVER w. HILL, SR., THE BIG BANG BROWN VS. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
BEYOND 151-58 (Jonathan K. Stubbs, ed. 2000); TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 43. 
29. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 135. 
30. The schools were located at North Carolina Central University and South Caro-
lina State College. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 63; see also W. Lewis Burke & William C. 
Hine, The School of Law at South Carolina State College: Its Creation (2004) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
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the University of Virginia School of Law or the Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law at the College of William and Mary, the two gov-
ernment-sponsored law schools that served the Commonwealth, 
or the University of Richmond School of Law or the Washington 
and Lee University School of Law, the two mid-twentieth century 
proprietary law schools situated in the Old Dominion. 31 The cus-
tom or practice of segregated public education received codifica-
tion in the Virginia statutes during the 1870s32 and in the Vir-
ginia Constitution of 1902,33 while each source proscribed 
integrated schools at the primary and secondary levels of gov-
ernment-supported education. In 1922, Virginia Union Univer-
sity, a traditionally black institution which is located in Rich-
mond, commenced operation of a law school; however, nine years 
later, the University closed that program after the school had 
graduated only one class of students in 1927.34 
Over the three decades which followed the mid-1930s, Virginia 
systematically provided scholarships for substantial numbers of 
African-American residents who were willing to pursue graduate 
and legal education at institutions outside the Commonwealth, 
while in 1948 Virginia entered a compact with numerous other 
southern jurisdictions that would have established separate 
graduate and professional schools throughout the region for Afri-
can Americans.35 Three major phenomena seemingly animated 
these initiatives: efforts to prevent the desegregation of the Old 
Dominion's historically white public universities, to minimize the 
expense of implementing new, separate programs for African 
Americans in Virginia, and to avoid the import of the Supreme 
Court mandates, which required that the government-sponsored 
law and graduate programs at the Universities of Missouri, 
Oklahoma, and Texas enroll African Americans.36 The Common-
31. For a valuable historical account of legal education in Virginia, which also treats 
private schools that are no longer in existence, see W. HAMILTON BRYSON, LEGAL 
EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA, 1779-1979, at 1-63 (1982). 
32. Act of Mar. 26, 1872, ch. 370, 1872 Va. Acts 460 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 22-221 (Rep!. Vol. 1969)), repealed by Act of Feb. 24, 1971, ch. 102, 1971 Va. Acts. 
128. 
33. VA. CONST. art. IX,§ 140. See also HILL, supra note 28, at xvii-xviii. 
34. See BRYSON, supra note 31, at 53-54; see also SMITH, supra note 15, at 61-62. 
35. See Anthony B. Deel, Virginia's Minimal Resistance: The Desegregation of Public 
Graduate and Professional Education, 1935-55, at 56-57, 60-63 (1990) (unpublished M.A. 
thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, on file with author). 
36. See supra notes 18-21, 23-27 and accompanying text. 
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wealth did not establish a separate law school for African-
Americans, even though some border states and quite a few 
southernjurisdictions created those institutions.37 
Many African Americans residing in the Old Dominion who de-
cided they would pursue a legal education before 1950 were 
forced to matriculate out of state, and numerous students con-
cluded they would study at the Howard University School of 
Law.38 Howard, by virtue of the University's location in Washing-
ton, D.C., was the institution nearest Virginia's larger cities 
which would admit African Americans for legal training, and the 
school had earned a strong reputation, particularly under the ex-
cellent leadership of Charles Hamilton Houston and William 
Henry Hastie during the 1930s and 1940s.39 Indeed, Douglas 
Wilder, who would eventually become the first African American 
to serve as the governor of any United States jurisdiction, began 
attending Howard Law School with a tuition grant from the 
Commonwealth in 1956.40 
B. The Initial Desegregation of Virginia's Law Schools 
Shortly after the Supreme Court of the United States had ren-
dered the 1948 opinion which desegregated public legal education 
in Oklahoma, Gregory H. Swanson, who graduated from Howard 
Law School that year, applied for admission to undertake gradu-
ate study at the University of Virginia School of Law.41 The law 
school dean and his faculty colleagues favored admitting Swan-
son; however, the University Board of Visitors directed Colgate 
W. Darden, the institution's president and former Old Dominion 
Governor, to seek a formal opinion from Attorney General J. 
Lindsay Almond, Jr.42 President Darden asked the Attorney Gen-
eral for the Commonwealth whether the Virginia state constitu-
tional and statutory provisions, which prohibited integrated gov-
ernment-supported education, imposed a legal duty on the law 
37. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also infra note 66 and accompanying 
text. 
38. See OGLETREE, supra note 1, at 114-16; see also SMITH, supra note 15, at 42-56. 
39. See OGLETREE, supra note 1, at 114-16; see also SMITH, supra note 15, at 48--54. 
40. See Deel, supra note 35, at 145; see also DONALD P. BAKER, WILDER: HOLD FAST TO 
DREAMS: A BIOGRAPHY OF L. DOUGLAS WILDER 53-62, 81 (1989). 
41. See WALLENSTEIN, supra note 11, at 76; see also Deel, supra note 35, at 75-102. 
42. See WALLENSTEIN, supra note 11, at 107. 
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school to refuse Swanson admission.43 Almond predicted that if 
the University rejected the application submitted by Swanson he 
would challenge the exclusion before a three-judge federal court 
and easily win, partly because the Attorney General thought the 
relevant constitutional and statutory provisos were inapplicable 
to professional and graduate education and the Supreme Court 
law school precedent would clearly govern the dispute's resolu-
tion.44 
When the University apparently decided to ignore Attorney 
General Almond's prescient advice and to deny Swanson admis-
sion, the applicant expeditiously pursued federal court litigation 
in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Virginia.45 The three-judge panel hearing the suit comprised Cir-
cuit Judges John J. Parker and Morris Soper who were members 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as 
well as District Judge John Paul who was a member of the West-
ern District of Virginia.46 The panel conducted a rather perfunc-
tory hearing on Swanson's request for a preliminary injunction in 
which Attorney General Almond merely read the defense brief 
and informed the judges that the only contested matters were the 
final decree's form and scope.47 The three jurists determined that 
the law school could not reject the plaintiff solely on the grounds 
of race because the Commonwealth maintained only one govern-
ment-sponsored institution which provided graduate legal 
study.48 The panel appeared to depend substantially on the Su-
preme Court of the United States opinions that implicated the 
law school challenges, in particular the Sweatt v. Painter decision 
which the Justices had rendered several months earlier, while the 
three judges found that the University had denied Swanson equal 
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and enjoined the institution from re-
jecting the plaintiff and future applicants on the basis of race. 49 
Thus, during September 1950, Swanson commenced graduate 
study at the University of Virginia School of Law under federal 
43. See id.; see also supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
44. 1950-51 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 58 (1950). 
45. Swanson v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., No. 30 (W.D. Va. Sept. 5, 1950). 
46. Swanson, No. 30, at 3. 
47. See Deel, supra note 35, at 79. 
48. Swanson, No. 30, at 1-2; see also Deel, supra note 35, at 79. 
49. Swanson , No. 30, at 2; see also supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
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court order, thereby initiating token desegregation of the Com-
monwealth's professional and graduate schools.50 The determina-
tion which the three-judge panel issued seemingly contributed to 
the decision by the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College 
of William and Mary to accept its initial African-American law 
student, Edward Travis, during 1951.51 
C. Desegregation After 1951 
Although the University of Virginia and the College of William 
and Mary admitted these two African-American law students ear-
lier than virtually all of the remaining southern jurisdictions' law 
schools enrolled African Americans, the pace of legal education's 
desegregation in the Old Dominion was not very expeditious after 
the mid-twentieth century breakthrough. Over the decade follow-
ing the Supreme Court of the United States pronouncement in 
Brown v. Board of Education, a quite small number of African 
Americans annually matriculated at the two government-
supported law schools and in certain years no African American 
enrolled.52 Indeed, the first African-American woman did not 
graduate from the University of Virginia School of Law until 
1970.53 Elaine Jones, who recently served as the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund Director-Counsel, only matriculated after the insti-
tution surprised her by accepting her application and not offering 
her a scholarship to pursue a legal education outside the Com-
monwealth. 54 As late as 1969, African Americans constituted 
fewer than a dozen of the 340 students in the University of Vir-
ginia entering class.55 The Old Dominion was clearly not alone, 
however. For example, North Carolina forced African Americans 
50. See Deel, supra note 35, at 80-81; see also DAVISON M. DOUGI.AS, READING, 
WRITING & RACE: THE DESEGREGATION OF THE CHARLOTTE SCHOOLS (1995) (suggesting 
that the North Carolina primary and secondary schools practiced token desegregation 
immediately after the Supreme Court had issued Brown). 
51. See Deel, supra note 35, at 114. 
52. Michael A. Fletcher, Brown+ 50: The Fight Goes On, WASH. POST, June 23, 2003, 
at Cl. 
53. Id. 
54. Elaine R. Jones, Public Service Law, Address Before the University of Virginia 
Women's Center (Sept. 24, 1998), available at http://www.virginia.edu/uvanewsmakers 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
55. Statistical Information: University of Virginia (Nov. 1969) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Virginia Office of Institutional Analysis). 
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to litigate the issue of whether Brown had required undergradu-
ate school desegregation, 56 while Georgia expended nearly a half-
million dollars in 1963 on out-of-state tuition grants for African 
Americans after a federal court had ordered the University of 
Georgia to desegregate.57 
The proprietary educational institutions in the Old Dominion 
desegregated even more slowly than did the government-
sponsored entities apparently because they were less vulnerable 
to litigation. The Washington and Lee University School of Law 
admitted Leslie D. Smith, Jr., the school's initial African-
American graduate, in 1966.58 The University of Richmond School 
of Law correspondingly accepted Thomas Nathan Payne, the 
school's first African-American student, in 1968.59 
IV. LESSONS FROM DESEGREGATION 
Several lessons can be derived from this assessment of legal 
education's desegregation in the Commonwealth. First, Virginia, 
like nearly all southern jurisdictions and certain border states, 
attempted to maintain segregation as long as the Old Dominion 
could. For instance, the jurisdiction's two public law schools did 
not accept African Americans before the mid-twentieth century, 
while the proprietary institutions only enrolled African Ameri-
cans during the 1960s.60 Moreover, the University of Virginia did 
not admit Gregory Swanson until he and his counsel persuaded a 
federal court to so mandate.61 The institution required the African 
American to litigate his application's denial on the basis of race, 
56. See Frasier v. Bd. of Trs., 134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D.N.C. 1955), affd, 350 U.S. 979 
(1956). 
57. See Entin, supra note 8, at 67; see also CALVIN TRILLIN, AN EDUCATION IN 
GEORGIA 46-49 (Brown Thrasher Books 1991) (1963). 
58. See WALLENSTEIN, supra note 11, at 76. 
59. Email from John R. Barden, Head, Reference and Research Services, William T. 
Muse Law Library, University of Richmond School of Law, to Carl W. Tobias, Williams 
Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law (June 25, 2004, 11:48:00 EST) (on 
file with author); cf REUBEN E. ALLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY 1830-1971, at 245 
(1977) (stating that in 1964 the Board of Trustees of the University of Richmond School of 
Law began to enroll all qualified applicants without respect to race). But see Deel, supra 
note 35, at 151 (suggesting that the first African-American student was accepted in 1964). 
60. See supra notes 31-33, 35-36, 58-59 and accompanying text. 
61. Swanson v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., No. 30, at 2 (W.D. Va. Sept. 5, 
1950). 
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even in the face of an opinion that the University would almost 
certainly lose a suit by the Attorney General, who was apparently 
rather sympathetic to the Board of Visitors' perspective.62 When it 
first appeared that the Supreme Court of the United States might 
overturn segregation, the Commonwealth, like numerous other 
southern and border jurisdictions, instituted a program which 
furnished African American professional and graduate students 
out-of-state tuition grants during the mid-1930s and seemingly 
continued this endeavor for more than a decade after Brown had 
declared separate but equal education unconstitutional. 63 Indeed, 
as late as the 1960s, the University of Virginia was apparently of-
fering African-Americans scholarships to attend law schools out-
side the jurisdiction.64 Once it became clear that the Justices 
could in fact order desegregation, the Old Dominion joined a 1948 
interstate compact which would have provided separate graduate 
and legal education for African Americans across the South. 65 
However, the Commonwealth, unlike quite a few border and 
southern jurisdictions, notably Maryland, Missouri, North Caro-
lina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas, did not institute a 
separate law school for African Americans.66 
Second, despite these special measures to prevent the desegre-
gation of government-supported legal education which the Old 
Dominion implemented, Virginia was considerably more protec-
tive of each successively lower phase in the public school hierar-
chy. Illustrative were the Commonwealth's willingness to under-
take token integration of government-sponsored professional and 
graduate education if that action would forestall the desegrega-
tion of public undergraduate schooling and the Old Dominion's 
amenability to integrating undergraduate education if this would 
slow desegregation at the primary and secondary level.67 
62. Once the federal court had ordered Virginia to admit Swanson, William and Mary 
at least enrolled Edward Travis without requiring that he litigate the issue. See supra 
notes 40-47, 49 and accompanying text. 
63. See supra notes 35, 40, 54 and accompanying text. 
64. See id. 
65. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
66. See supra notes 30, 37 and accompanying text. Perhaps the most important reason 
for the Commonwealth's determination was the longstanding tradition of frugal support 
for public education in the Old Dominion. 
67. See Deel, supra note 35, at 145-49. 
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Third, although the Commonwealth's two government-support-
ed law schools did enroll African Americans before practically all 
other southern jurisdictions desegregated and prior to the Su-
preme Court resolution of Brown v. Board of Education, desegre-
gation's pace after 1950 was not expeditious in Virginia public le-
gal education and was even slower in the private institutions.68 
For the decade which followed Brown, desegregation could fairly 
be characterized as gradual in the government-sponsored schools 
and non-existent in the proprietary ones. 
Several reasons may explain this delayed pace. First, the Uni-
versity of Virginia and the College of William and Mary possibly 
avoided much public scrutiny because those concerned about in-
tegrating the institutions were preoccupied at that time with the 
all-consuming effort of overcoming "Massive Resistance" to pri-
mary and secondary school desegregation.69 Even after, the Su-
preme Court issued the 1955 "all deliberate speed" opinion in 
Brown II, 70 the Court essentially abandoned the field for nearly a 
decade by deciding a rather small number of cases. 71 Perhaps, 
some of the identical political and related forces which opposed 
primary and secondary education's integration affected law 
schools or at least made them cautious about promptly desegre-
gating. Higher education in general and law schools specifically 
also had relatively few incentives to integrate until the 1960s 
when the United States government threatened institutions that 
remained segregated with discontinuation of federal grants. 72 
Certain above ideas and others could apply to private legal educa-
tion. Because the schools were not directly funded by Virginia 
state resources, the institutions may have thought they had less 
responsibility, and might have experienced limited pressure, to 
desegregate. 
68. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
69. See NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MAsSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN 
THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950s (1997); see also ROBBINS L. GATES, THE MAKING OF 
MAsSIVE RESISTANCE: VIRGINIA'S POLITICS OF PuBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 1954-
1956 (1962). 
70. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
71. See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 114-17; TUSHNET, supra note 24, at 217-56. 
72. See PATTERSON, supra note 2. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education's issu-
ance by the Supreme Court of the United States provides an aus-
picious occasion to reflect on legal education's desegregation in 
the Old Dominion. The University of Virginia School of Law and 
the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of William and 
Mary desegregated before Brown's publication. This phenomenon, 
however, did not necessarily foster expeditious integration of the 
Old Dominion's law schools. Indeed, for more than a decade sub-
sequent to Brown, the public schools undertook only minimal de-
segregation while the proprietary institutions graduated no Afri-
can Americans. 
